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ABSTRACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) broadly prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in employment and other settings. Several empirical studies have suggested that
employment levels of individuals with disabilities declined rather than increased after the ADA's
passage. This paper provides a first look at whether lower disabled employment levels after the
ADA might have resulted from increased participation in educational opportunities by individuals
with disabilities as a rational response to the ADA's employment protections. The main empirical
finding is that individuals with disabilities who were not employed in the years following legal
innovation in the form of the ADA were more likely than their pre-ADA counterparts to give
educational participation as their reason for not being employed. This preliminary evidence suggests
the value of further study, with better education data, of the relationship between the ADA's







Identifying the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act Using State-Law Variation: 




            Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) with an unusual 
degree of political consensus and popular support.  The ADA broadly prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of disability in employment and other settings.  Given the breadth of the political 
support for the ADA, it was quite unexpected to find early evidence that the law actually 
worsened rather than improved employment prospects for individuals with disabilities (A.M. 
Gamboa 1995).   
  Subsequent papers have closely examined the question of the employment effects of the 
ADA, reaching varying conclusions.  Thomas DeLeire (2000) and Daron Acemoglu and Joshua 
Angrist (2001) – some of the earliest papers in what has become a substantial literature – offer 
significant evidence of disabled employment declines resulting from the ADA’s enactment.  
Other authors, however, have questioned whether the decline in disabled employment in the 
years following the ADA’s enactment is actually a consequence of the law or whether instead the 
decline resulted from other contemporaneous factors such as changes in federal disability 
benefits levels or changes in health status (e.g., John Bound and Timothy Waidmann 2000; 
Douglas Kruse and Lisa Schur 2003).   
            Variation in state-level employment discrimination regimes for individuals with 
disabilities in the period before the ADA’s enactment provides a helpful means of cutting 
through the existing thicket and identifying more credibly the effects of the ADA on outcomes –
in terms of both employment and (my focus here) educational participation – for individuals with 
disabilities.  Prior to the ADA’s enactment, some states had employment discrimination regimes 
that closely mirrored the ADA in both requiring employers to avoid disability-based   2
discrimination in hiring, firing, and terms and conditions of employment and requiring 
employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” – such as assistive technology or changes in 
workplace structures – to individuals with disabilities (see Table 1, column 1).  Another group of 
states tracked the ADA in prohibiting disability-based discrimination in hiring, firing, and terms 
and conditions of employment, but did not require reasonable accommodations (Table 1, 
columns 2 and 3).  A third group imposed no limits whatever on the treatment of disabled 
employees in the pre-ADA period (Table 1, column 3).  With respect to the ADA’s employment 
effects, this state-law variation permits inquiry into the relationship between the impact of the 
ADA’s employment discrimination provisions on disabled employment and the degree to which 
these provisions were actually a legal innovation in a given state.  If disabled employment effects 
are significantly correlated with the degree to which the employment discrimination provisions 
of the ADA were an innovation in a given state, then non-ADA changes around the time of the 
ADA’s passage – such as changes federal disability benefits or health status – may not be the 
best explanations for declining disabled employment after the ADA.
1 
In fact the degree to which the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions were an 
innovation relative to pre-ADA state law is closely connected to the degree to which disabled 
employment declined just after the ADA’s passage (Christine Jolls and J.J. Prescott 2004).  In 
particular, while relative disabled employment declined significantly just after the ADA’s 
enactment in states in which these provisions were a substantial innovation relative to the pre-
ADA state-level employment discrimination regime, relative disabled employment was stable in 
states with ADA-like employment discrimination regimes in place prior to the ADA’s 
enactment.  The innovation-related employment declines identified by the state-law variation, 
however, were concentrated in the initial years after the ADA’s enactment.  This finding about   3
the timing of the ADA’s employment effects suggests the empirical plausibility of the potential 
explanation offered by Jolls (2000:280) for disabled employment declines after the ADA:  
disabled individuals in states in which the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions were a 
substantial innovation relative to pre-ADA state law may have temporarily reduced their labor 
supply because these provisions, by raising the returns to education for individuals with 
disabilities in those states, encouraged such individuals to invest in education.   
This paper provides preliminary evidence on the possibility that the ADA increased 
participation in educational opportunities by individuals with disabilities in states in which the 
ADA’s employment discrimination provisions were a substantial innovation compared to states 
in which they were not.  As in the context of the ADA’s employment effects, examining the 
ADA’s impact on disabled educational participation against the backdrop of states with 
preexisting ADA-like employment discrimination regimes helps to control for general changes in 
incentives for disabled educational participation that may have occurred contemporaneously with 
the ADA’s enactment.  A limited review of evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
provides qualified support for the idea that movement in disabled educational participation after 
the ADA’s enactment was positively correlated with the degree to which the ADA’s employment 
discrimination provisions were a substantial innovation relative to pre-ADA state law. 
 
I.  Educational Investment and the Labor Market 
  In a conventional labor market in which the typical worker is demanded and paid in 
accordance with the worker’s marginal revenue product of labor, taste-based discrimination 
against a group of workers – such as individuals with disabilities – reduces this group’s wage 
below the group’s marginal revenue product of labor and also depresses the group’s employment 
level (John Donohue 1986:1415-1418).
2  Empirically, Marjorie Baldwin and William Johnson   4
(1994) offer evidence of large discrimination-induced wage and employment gaps between 
disabled and nondisabled workers.  Within this framework, the effect of an employment 
discrimination law such as the ADA – assuming the law is fully enforceable – is to align the 
wages and employment levels of the disadvantaged group with those of the advantaged group 
(see Jolls 2000:243-51; Jolls 2001:693-94). 
  The implications of this analysis for disabled workers’ educational decisions are fairly 
straightforward.  Human capital theory suggests that decisions about educational investment are 
likely to be driven at least in part by the labor market returns to such investment.  Because 
employment discrimination law in the above analysis increases both the wages and the 
employment levels of disadvantaged workers, it increases the returns to educational investment 
by this group.  Thus, the enactment of an employment discrimination law should increase 
educational participation by members of the disadvantaged group.  In the context of the ADA, 
the new regime should increase educational participation by individuals with disabilities in the 
states in which the ADA’s employment discrimination provisions were an innovation compared 
to states in which they were not. 
 
II. Data   
            As is true in many areas of legal regulation (e.g., David Autor, John Donohue and 
Stewart Schwab 2003), state-level employment discrimination regimes for individuals with 
disabilities in the pre-ADA period consisted of a mix of statutory and judicial law.  Judicial 
opinions turn out to be an important source in understanding the pre-ADA state-level 
employment discrimination regimes because a number of states imposed obligations by judicial 
decision rather than by statutory provision, and because in some cases judicial opinions 
substantially clarified the meaning of an ambiguous statutory framework.  The state groupings   5
used in this paper reflect not only statutory law but also all pre-ADA case law available in the 
Westlaw legal database.  I refer to states in which the pre-ADA state-level regime mirrored the 
ADA’s employment discrimination provisions (column 1 of Table 1) as the “control” states; to 
states in which the pre-ADA state-level regime contained more limited regulation of the 
treatment of disabled employees (columns 2 and 3 of Table 1) as the “limited protection” states; 
and to states in which the pre-ADA state-level regime imposed no limits whatever on the 
treatment of disabled employees (column 4 of Table 1) as the “no protection” states.   
  For the disability status of individuals as well as most other demographic and economic 
variables used below, I rely on the March CPS.
3  The dependent variable of interest in the 
present work is participation in educational opportunities.  I measure educational participation 
using responses to the CPS question about whether the reason a respondent was not working in 
the observation year was the pursuit of educational opportunities.
4  Although there are various 
other educational participation questions in the CPS, this question seems best suited for 
examining the hypothesis that ADA-driven innovation relative to pre-ADA state-level 
employment discrimination law produced a short-run decline in disabled employment because of 
the positive effect of such innovation on disabled educational investment incentives.    
 
III. Disabled  Educational  Participation Before and After the ADA  
 
  Table 2 presents basic statistics on the mean proportion of individuals who give 
educational participation as the reason for not being employed for disabled versus nondisabled 
individuals, before and after the ADA, across the three state groups from Table 1.  While 
common practice in examining the effects of a changed legal regime is to examine two-year 
windows before and after the change (e.g., Jonathan Gruber 1994; Autor, Donohue and Schwab 
2002), the fact that there are only three states in one of the state groups here – the no-protection   6
group – means that the number of individuals who both identify as disabled in the CPS and give 
educational participation as their reason for not being employed in any given year is often 
extremely small (less than five) in this state group.  Thus, sensible examination of the ADA’s 
effects across the three state groups required the use of longer time windows.  The empirical 
analysis uses data from 1987, the first observation year for which disability status is available in 
the CPS, through 1997, five years after the first year in which the ADA was in effect.   
While the ADA went into effect in 1992, it was passed in June of 1990, and from the 
perspective of examining educational investment prompted by ADA-driven innovation in the 
legal treatment of employment discrimination the relevant “start date” is the date on which the 
ADA would have been viewed as a reliable basis on which to make decisions about education.  
Therefore, Table 2 treats the period from 1987 through 1990 as the pre-ADA period and the 
period from 1991 to 1997 as the post-ADA period.   
  The top two rows in Table 2 show the effect of the ADA’s enactment on disabled 
individuals in both the limited-protection state group, in which the ADA’s employment 
discrimination provisions were an innovation relative to pre-ADA state law, and the control state 
group, in which they were not.  The probability of a disabled individual giving educational 
participation as the reason for not being employed declined in the first state group relative to the 
second (a state-time difference of -.0039), but, as Table 2 shows, a similar pattern held for 
nondisabled individuals, leaving no significant relative effect of ADA-driven innovation on the 
educational participation of individuals with disabilities.  Looking still further down Table 2 to 
the comparison of the no-protection state group and the control group, however, a different 
pattern appears.  Educational participation of individuals with disabilities increased with the 
ADA’s enactment in the no-protection group – where the ADA’s employment discrimination   7
provisions were the most significant innovation – relative to the control group; by contrast, for 
the nondisabled, educational participation declined with the ADA’s enactment in the no-
protection group relative to the control group.  On balance, then, the simple mean probabilities 
point to an increase in relative disabled educational participation with the ADA’s enactment in 
no-protection states compared to control states.   
  Table 3 moves to a regression framework, employing the straightforward difference-in-
difference-in-difference (DDD) specification in equation (1) below, where Y denotes whether an 
individual was not employed because of participation in educational opportunities; i indexes 
individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes years; X denotes a vector of demographic and  
state-level economic characteristics; ADA denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 in the post-ADA 
period, DIS denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 for individuals with disabilities, LP 
denotes a dummy variable equal to 1 for states in the limited protection group; and NP denotes a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for states in the no-protection group:  
      Yijt = β 0 + β 1Xijt + β 2ADAt + β 3DISi + β 4LPj 
           + β 5NPj + β 6(ADAt x DISi) + β 7(ADAt x LPj)  
           + β 8(ADAt x NPj) + β 9(DISi x LPj)  
           + β 10(DISi x NPj) + β 11(ADAt x DISi x LPj)  
           + β 12(ADAt x DISi x NPj)                  (1)
5 
The coefficients of interest in equation (1) are the coefficients on the triple interaction terms, 
ADAt x DISi x LPj and ADAt x DISi x NPj.  These coefficients measure the change between the 
pre- and post-ADA periods in disabled versus nondisabled educational participation in limited-
protection and no-protection states, respectively, compared to control states.   
  The results in Table 3, which reflect a variety of timing assumptions, are consistent with 
the preliminary findings in Table 2.  As the top panel of Table 3 shows, the ADA’s enactment 
had no significant effect on disabled educational participation in the limited-protection states   8
compared to the control states, but it had a positive effect on disabled educational participation in 
the no-protection states compared to the control states.
6   In terms of magnitude, the estimated 
marginal effect of the ADA’s enactment on disabled educational participation in no-protection 
states compared to control states is 0.025 in column 1, 0.024 in column 2, 0.011 in column 3, and 
0.013 in column 4; these estimates reflect at least a doubling of the pre-ADA probability of 
disabled educational participation in no-protection states reported in Table 2 (0.0098). 
  An important concern with the results reported up until now is that the no-protection 
group, in which I estimate that the enactment of the ADA had a significant positive effect on 
relative disabled educational participation compared to the control group, consists of only three 
states, all of which are from the South (Table 1, column 4).  With respect to the small size of the 
group, the basic concern is that a large increase in disabled educational investment in one state – 
generated by some state-specific effect rather than by ADA-driven innovation – could be 
masking declines in disabled educational investment in the other states, which of course would 
make a causal link to the ADA unlikely.  Figure 1 below shows, however, that relative disabled 
educational investment followed an upward pattern in all three of the states in the no-protection 
group, compared to the trend in the control group.   
  A remaining concern with the results for the no-protection group stems from the lack of 
geographic diversity within that group.  The problem arises from the possibility that an 
unobserved shock in the southern region of the country between the pre- and post-ADA periods 
might, if it differentially affected disabled and nondisabled individuals, be driving the apparent 
effect of the ADA’s enactment on disabled educational participation in the no-protection group.  
A straightforward strategy to alleviate this concern about a possible “southern trend” is simply to   9
re-estimate equation (1) on just the southern states from each of the three state groups.  Results, 
reported in the bottom panel of Table 3, are consistent with the pattern described above.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
  This paper offers preliminary evidence that disabled educational participation responded 
positively to the ADA’s enactment in states with no pre-ADA restrictions on disability-based 
discrimination in employment.  Intuitively, even if – as the results here suggest – disabled 
individuals do not alter their educational participation in response to changes in the specific 
nature of the employment protections afforded to them, they may respond to the more obvious 
switch from no protection to the employment discrimination provisions of the ADA.  However, 
given the data limitations in the CPS, at most the empirical results presented here provide very 
preliminary evidence suggesting the value of further study, with better education data, of the 
relationship between the ADA’s enactment and disabled educational participation.  Such further 
study should also account for possible ADA-related changes in the quality or quantity of 
educational opportunities available to individuals with disabilities.   10
Figure 1:  Post-ADA Change in Relative 
Disabled Educational Participation in 









Notes:  Each bar represents the means-based DDD 
estimate of the ADA’s effect on relative disabled 
educational participation in the named state.  The 
means-based DDD estimate for a given state is 
computed by subtracting the post-ADA change in 
nondisabled educational participation in that state 
from the post-ADA change in disabled educational 
participation in the state; and then by subtracting 
from the resulting figure the comparable difference 
for the control state group.  The difference for the 
control state group, using the figures in Table 2, is 
.0034–.0053 = -.0019. 
 
   11
Table 1:  Pre-ADA State Laws Governing 




























































Notes:  Control states are states with pre-ADA 
employment discrimination regimes that both 
required employers to avoid disability-based 
discrimination in hiring, firing, and terms and 
conditions of employment and required employers to 
provide reasonable accommodations to individuals 
with disabilities.  Limited-protection states are states 
with pre-ADA employment discrimination regimes 
that prohibited disability-based discrimination in 
hiring, firing, and terms and conditions of 
employment but did not require reasonable 
accommodations.  No-protection states are states that 
imposed no limits whatever on the treatment of 
disabled employees in the pre-ADA period.  For 
further details on the pre-ADA state-level regimes, 
see Jolls and Prescott (2004).   12
Table 2:  Means Analysis by State, Time, and 
Disability Status (Men and Women – Ages 18-58) 
(1) COMPARISON OF LIMITED-
PROTECTION AND CONTROL STATES 
DISABLED 






Limited-Protection     0.0137    0.0131 -0.0006
     States      (0.0012)  (0.0009)    (0.0015)
       
Control States        0.0102    0.0135 0.0034 
      (0.0015)  (0.0014)  (0.0020)
       
Time-State Diff.        -0.0039
          (0.0025)
NONDISABLED 






Limited-Protection      0.0254   0.0293 0.0039 
     States      (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)
        
Control States       0.0176   0.0229 0.0053 
      (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0007)
       
Time-State Diff.        -0.0014
          (0.0009)
Time-State-Group   -0.0026
Diff.           (0.0026)
(2) COMPARISON OF NO-PROTECTION 
AND CONTROL STATES 
DISABLED 






No-Protection     0.0098   0.0157 0.0059 
     States      (0.0037)  (0.0036)  (0.0051)
         
Control States       0.0102   0.0135 0.0034 
      (0.0015)  (0.0014)  (0.0020)
         
Time-State Diff.        0.0025 
        (0.0055)
NONDISABLED 






No-Protection     0.0327   0.0322   -0.0006 
     States      (0.0018)  (0.0014)  (0.0023)
        
Control States       0.0176   0.0229 0.0053 
      (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0007)
         
Time-State Diff.        -0.0059
          (0.0024)
Time-State-Group      0.0084 
Diff.            (0.0060)
Notes: Means reflect the average probability of 
giving educational participation as a reason for not 
being employed.  All estimates are weighted using 
CPS survey weights.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  The pre-ADA period is 1987-1990.   
The post-ADA period is 1991-1997.  Some 
differences do not quite sum because of rounding.  
See Table 1 for state groups.   13
Table 3:  Probit Regression Results 
(Men and Women – Ages 18-58) 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the 
respondent was not employed in the observation year 
because of participation in educational opportunities 
and 0 otherwise.  Robust standard errors clustered on 
state-disability interactions are in parentheses below 
coefficient estimates, and robust standard errors 
clustered on state-disability-year interactions are in 
square brackets below coefficient estimates.  Columns 
(1) and (2) treat 1987-1989 as the pre-ADA years and 
1990-1997 as the post-ADA years.  Column (3) treats 
1987-1990 as the pre-ADA years and 1991-1997 as the 
post-ADA years.  Column (4) treats 1987-1990 as the 
pre-ADA years and 1993-1997 as the post-ADA years. 
In the top panel, N=822,331 in columns (1)-(3) and 
664,030 in column (4).  In the bottom panel, 
N=116,414 in columns (1)-(3) and 93,837 in column 
(4).  The southern states are Alabama, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  All 
regressions employ CPS survey weights and include 
controls for age, race, sex, educational attainment, 
marital status, union membership, state disability 
benefit receipts, the interaction of disability and state 
disability benefit receipts, state unemployment rate, and 
the interaction of disability and state unemployment 
rate.  See Table 1 and equation (1) for further details. 
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1 For changes in federal disability benefits or health status to explain such a pattern of 
employment declines, these changes would have to be correlated with pre-ADA state-level 
employment discrimination regimes, which seems unlikely. 
2 In some markets, workers may receive an “efficiency wage” rather than a wage equal to the 
marginal revenue product of labor, and the effects of employment discrimination law require 
separate analysis in such settings.   
3 For state receipts of disability benefits and state unemployment rates I rely on the data series 
generously provided by David Autor and Mark Duggan.  For an extensive discussion of various 
issues related to the use of the CPS disability measure, including the possibility that the ADA’s 
enactment could have altered the shape or size of the group responding “yes” to the CPS 
disability question, see Jolls and Prescott (2004). 
4 Other choices in response to this question are retirement, inability to find work, family 
obligations, illness/disability, and “other”. 
5 In specifications with state and year fixed effects, ADAt, LPj, and NPj are omitted. 
6 Both Table 2 and Table 3 use data on all respondents, not just those who are not employed.  
Limiting the sample to just those who are not employed does not alter the basic pattern of results 
reported in Table 3, although it modestly reduces the precision of the estimates. 
 